Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A dynamic approach by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques et al.
  
 
Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A
dynamic approach
Citation for published version (APA):
Herings, P. J-J., Peeters, R., & Yang, M. (2018). Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A
dynamic approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 266(1), 328-339.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.09.011
Document status and date:
Published: 01/04/2018
DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.09.011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2018) 328–339 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
European Journal of Operational Research 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor 
Innovative Applications of O.R. 
Piracy on the Internet: Accommodate it or ﬁght it? A dynamic 
approach 
P. Jean-Jacques Herings a , ∗, Ronald Peeters a , Michael S. Yang b 
a Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht 6200 MD, The Netherlands 
b Frontier Economics, 71 High Holborn, London WC1V 6DA, United Kingdom 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 30 June 2016 
Accepted 10 September 2017 
Available online 18 September 2017 
Keywords: 
Game theory 
Economics 
Markov processes 
OR in societal problem analysis 
Pricing, 
a b s t r a c t 
This paper uses a dynamic stochastic model to solve for the optimal pricing policy of music recordings in 
the presence of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks eroding their sales. We employ a policy iteration algorithm on 
a discretized state space to numerically compute the optimal pricing policy. The realistically calibrated 
model reﬂects the real-world ﬁgures we observe and provides estimates of the optimal pricing policy as 
well as comparative statics ﬁgures. The pricing policy is such that, for a given P2P network size, prices 
are increasing in the number of buyers of the product and, for a given number of buyers of the prod- 
uct, prices are non-monotonic in the P2P network size. Surprisingly, in the presence of P2P networks, 
increases in production costs and decreases in the valuation of the product increase the consumer and 
total surplus. A higher valuation of the product leads to a lower steady state price. Increased switching 
costs have a negative effect on prices and proﬁts, so the long term incentive to attract new consumers 
dominates the short term incentive to harvest loyal consumers. The full enforcement of intellectual prop- 
erty rights has adverse effect on both consumer surplus and total welfare. 
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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i  1. Introduction 
Ever since Napster emerged in 1999, P2P (peer-to-peer) ﬁle-
sharing networks have been the center of piracy on the Internet.
We have seen different generations of P2P technology come and go
thanks to the legal pursuits launched by various authorities and in-
terest groups alike and the development of new technologies that
help evade them. The content providers try to defend their cre-
ations from free riding; whilst the online communities try to pre-
serve the true free and sharing spirit of the Internet. The battle
goes on and on, but we cannot ignore the impact it has had on
the markets of information goods, particularly the music industry. 
Numerous studies, especially empirical ones, over the years
have tried to explain the relationship between the decline in mu-
sic sales and the rise of P2P networks. Blackburn (2004) , Liebowitz
(2004) , Rob and Waldfogel (2006) , and Zentner (2006) ﬁnd that
downloading (via P2P ﬁle-sharing networks) is at least partially re-
sponsible for the decrease in music sales. Liebowitz (2006) con-
cludes that ﬁle-sharing has clearly brought signiﬁcant harm to∗ Corresponding author. 
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0377-2217/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. he recording industry. In contrast, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf
2007) and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004) ﬁnd little robust evidence
hat P2P has caused the decrease in music sales. 
The classical theoretical literature on piracy and network ef-
ects include, among others, Economides (1996) , Katz and Shapiro
1985) , Katz and Shapiro (1986) , Johnson (1985) , and Takeyama
1994) . Recent papers that study P2P in speciﬁc include, among
thers, Gayer and Shy (2003) , Sundararajan (2004) , Bae and Choi
2006) , Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) , Herings, Peeters, and Yang
2010) , Dewan and Ramaprasad (2014) , Chang and Walter (2015) ,
nd Zhang (2017) . 
Gayer and Shy (2003) show how publishers of digitally-stored
roducts, including music, can utilize P2P to enhance sales of
heir product sold in the store or online. This result is mainly
ttributable to the positive consumptive externality ingredient in
heir model. Sundararajan (2004) addresses the issue of optimal
igital rights management systems in markets with digital piracy.
sing a sample comprising 5864 albums from 634 artists sold
n the years 1992–2011, Zhang (2017) shows that the effect of
igital rights management on sales highly depends on the al-
um’s age and position on the sales distribution, with new pop-
lar albums suffering and older niche or unpopular albums ben-
ﬁtting from a removal of digital rights management. Peitz and
aelbroeck (2006) show that under suﬃcient taste heterogene-
ty and product diversity, the positive effect of downloading on
P.J.-J. Herings et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2018) 328–339 329 
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a  ales due to sampling may compensate the direct negative effect.
his result is mainly driven by the information asymmetry be-
ween the buyers and the sellers of the product, and downloaded
les can help buyers identify their favorite products more eas-
ly and hence encourage sales. A recent empirical investigation on
he impacts of social media on music sales is provided by Dewan
nd Ramaprasad (2014) . Herings et al. (2010) analyzes the differ-
nt market structures that may form. The paper concludes that,
epending on different circumstances, the ﬁrm will employ pric-
ng strategies either to deter the entry of a network or to ac-
ommodate it. Moreover, music industry proﬁts decrease when the
eneric cost factor of downloading declines, i.e. when the society is
ore downloader-friendly, whereas total welfare increases. Chang
nd Walter (2015) extends the analysis of Herings et al. (2010) by
aking the investment by the P2P network to improve the qual-
ty and accessibility of the information goods an endogenous
ariable. 
All the theoretical studies on this subject have been of a static
ature. This implies that in the presence of demand side external-
ties there may be multiple equilibria due to coordination issues
elated to network size. The literature has always focused on the
aximally achievable network size. However, these models lack in-
ights on how such networks actually form, step by step, from zero
o a steady-state network size; how the ﬁrm prices strategically to
ompete with the network every step of the way; and how society
s affected during the process. This makes it impossible for such
odels to address the dynamic development of the P2P network
s we see it in reality. 
Only a dynamic model can bring such insights, which is what
his paper is designed to achieve. Dynamic stochastic models with
etwork externalities have been recently studied in the industrial
rganization literature, mainly using numerical methods. Examples
re Markovich (2008) and Markovich and Moenius (2009) which
tudy the dynamics caused by the iterations between hardware
nd software; Jenkins, Liu, Matzkin, and Mc (2004) studies a styl-
zed version of the browser war between Netscape and Microsoft,
here the entrant may have “grabbed” market shares from the in-
umbent and thereby tipped the market; Chen, Doraszelski, and
arrington (2009) studies competing ﬁrms’ incentives to make
heir products compatible and the possible effects that may pre-
ent market dominance; and Arie and Grieco (2014) investigate
he effect of switching costs on market dominance and equilib-
ium prices. A framework for numerically analyzing dynamic in-
eractions in imperfectly competitive industries is proposed by
oraszelski and Pakes (2007) , which provides an excellent sum-
ary of the main approach for models of this kind. Doraszelski
nd Satterthwaite (2010) show how this class of models can be
ormulated to ensure the existence of a computationally tractable
arkov-perfect equilibrium. 
In this paper, we use a dynamic model to solve for the opti-
al pricing policy of a ﬁrm that releases music products while be-
ng exposed to a competing P2P ﬁle-sharing network on the Inter-
et. In the model, there is a ﬁrm who sets the price of its mu-
ic product every period and a continuum of consumers who de-
ide whether to make a legal purchase of the music product, to
ownload the music from P2P, or to not acquire the music at all.
he timing involves discrete periods with inﬁnite horizon. The ﬁrm
s forward looking and strives to maximize the present value of
ll future proﬁts by choosing a state-dependent pricing policy; the
tate being the shares of legal sales, the P2P network, and the un-
erved market. The consumers make one of the three choices in
rder to maximize their utility while taking into account the price
nd the state. Consumers are ex ante identical, but receive random
tility shocks prior to their purchasing decision every period anew.
witching costs are imposed on the consumers who switch to a
roduct, from previously consuming the other product or not con-uming at all. The ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy is derived numeri-
ally and provides insight in the market share dynamics. 
Other work on the optimal pricing policy of a ﬁrm selling infor-
ation goods while dealing with piracy has been done by Khouja
nd Smith (2007) and Waters (2015) . In these papers, the emphasis
s on the sales of a single product with a limited life time and the
se of skimming strategies to maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt by ﬁrst
elling the legal product to consumers with high valuations for it.
iracy is modeled by assuming that some multiple of legal sales
ill lead to illegal sales. This reduces demand for the legal prod-
ct, since consumers buy only once. In our model, the demand
or the legal product renews in every period and the extent of
iracy is endogenously determined as a consequence of consumers’
hoices. 
To illustrate our model, we have calibrated its parameters to
eal-world data. To do so, we use data from the period between
999 and 2007. The year 1999 has been chosen as the starting
oint of appearance of illegal P2P networks since, as argued in
aldfogel (2010) , in 1999 the appearance of Napster made it con-
enient for consumers to download music illegally from P2P net-
orks. According to the RIAA (2009) year-end report, the year
007 is the last year in which legal downloads and streaming
f music were not very signiﬁcant yet and the main revenues
or music companies were coming from physical CD sales. Al-
hough our model is by no means restricted to the legal music
ales taking the form of CDs, it would be unreasonable to assume
hat the model’s parameter values are the same before and after
007. 
Although we calibrate the model to data coming from the pe-
iod 1999–2007, it is by no means the case that new technologi-
al developments like legal downloads, streaming services, or In-
ernet radio have eliminated piracy after 2007. For instance, the
eport ( MUSO, 2017 ) of the content protection company MUSO re-
ently revealed data showing that during 2016, 191 billion visits
o piracy websites were made globally, out of which 34.2 billion
ere visits to music piracy sites. This represents a modest decline
f 6% compared to music piracy in 2015. Although by now web
treaming sites are the most popular method for consuming ille-
al content, public torrent sites are still the second most popu-
ar method for doing so. As IFPI (2017) puts it: “Protecting music
rom being illegally distributed – and therefore undermining the
ecovering legitimate music market – remains a key priority for the
ndustry.”
Switching costs turn out to be quite important to match the de-
elopment of the real-world data during 1999–2007. We use cali-
ration to estimate the value of switching costs to be equal to $12.
e think of a signiﬁcant part of these switching costs as being
ental costs of switching and time needed to evaluate a change
n behavior. Indeed, there is a substantial empirical literature sug-
esting a status quo bias. Values for switching costs as found in
he empirical literature for a wide spectrum of applications are
ell in line with the value found for our application. To give some
xamples, Shy (2002) examines the Israeli mobile phone industry
nd ﬁnds switching costs equal to $269 on average. In the Finnish
emand-deposit banking industry, he ﬁnds average switching costs
qual to $331. Shcherbakov (2009) estimates switching costs in the
aid TV industry to be $109 for cable subscribers and $186 for
atellite subscribers. Just to give an example from a market that
oes not have any kind of technologically determined lock-in ef-
ects, Shum (2004) estimates the average switching costs for break-
ast cereals to be $4.33. For a nice survey of recent empirical work
hat estimates the size of switching costs in a variety of markets,
e refer to Arie and Grieco (2014) . 
An interesting point of our approach is that we can study how
etworks develop in a dynamic process without having to make
ny assumptions on consumer coordination as in the conventional
330 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2018) 328–339 
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=static models of network economics. We can also observe exactly
how the ﬁrm sets its price conditioned on its market share and
that of the network. While for given network size the price the
ﬁrm sets is generally increasing in its market share, for given mar-
ket share the price behaves non-monotonically in the network size.
Sometimes the ﬁrm sets the price very low in order to win vital
market shares to ﬁght against the P2P network, while other times
it accommodates the network by setting a high price to reap the
proﬁt from its own installed customer base. 
We use the model to compute the changes in proﬁts, consumer
surplus and total welfare. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt decreases steadily over
the years, resulting in a loss of $1.0 billion in annual proﬁts by
the year 2007. However, consumer surplus increases by $122.0 bil-
lion per year in the same period, resulting in a huge increase in
the annual total surplus generated by the P2P downloads. Next we
turn to the comparative statics at the steady state resulting from
the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy after the appearance of P2P. On
the one hand, we ﬁnd the standard results that the ﬁrm’s sales
quantities and proﬁts increase in the consumer’s valuation of its
product, decrease in its production costs, and decrease in the con-
sumer’s valuation of the illegal download. At the same time, we
ﬁnd that higher production costs increase consumer and total sur-
plus, which is caused by the positive downloading externalities re-
lated to the P2P network. For exactly the same reason, we ﬁnd that
a higher valuation of the ﬁrm’s product has a negative effect on
consumer and total surplus. Higher switching costs lead to lower
prices and proﬁts, but also less consumer surplus, both because of
the higher costs of switching and the weaker development of the
P2P network. 
One of our most important ﬁndings is that consumer surplus
and total welfare is negatively related to the generic cost factor of
downloading. This result coincides with the ﬁndings from papers
such as Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Herings et al. (2010) in
the sense that the existence of P2P actually enhances total wel-
fare. This implies that by making ﬁle-sharing more diﬃcult for the
consumers, the government is effectively curbing the society from
enjoying a high welfare level. 
Many of the counterintuitive comparative statics results are
caused by the positive downloading externalities as generated by
the P2P network. We also analyze a model where downloading
costs are constant and there are no such externalities. We argue
that such an alternative model is not compatible with the observed
data. 
In our model, the quality of the legal product is not affected
by the existence of P2P networks. As long as we consider a lim-
ited time period, say from 1999 to 2007, we believe such an as-
sumption is justiﬁed. But for the long run, it clearly may not be so,
and it would be interesting to extend our model to one with en-
dogenous quality choices. It is commonly believed that piracy leads
to lower incentives to invest in innovation and thereby to lower-
quality products. Nevertheless, Lahiri and Dey (2013) ﬁnd many
practical examples that contradict this claim. Moreover, they de-
velop a model of the ﬁrm’s quality decision problem in the pres-
ence of piracy. It is found that in certain situations lower enforce-
ment of property rights increases the monopolist’s incentive to in-
vest in quality. Similarly, in the closely related literature on coun-
terfeits, Qian (2014) discusses the advertising and substitution ef-
fects of counterfeits, and ﬁnds a positive effect of counterfeits for
high-end products and a negative effect for low-end products. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the dynamic model is described in detail. Next,
Section 3 explains how the numerical computations are conducted.
In Section 4 the model is calibrated and the parameter values for
the benchmark scenarios are set. The model outcomes and predic-
tions are then presented in Section 5 , and comparative statics are
analyzed in Section 6 . Section 7 concludes. . The model 
Each period, music products are being offered by a ﬁrm, but can
lso be illegally downloaded for free via a P2P network. Buying the
roduct from the ﬁrm means acquiring a legal product, either in
hysical or digital form, at a store at a given price. Our model does
ot distinguish between both forms as long as the sales are legal.
or an in depth analysis of the ﬁrm’s choice between selling the
roduct in physical form, digital form, or both, we refer the reader
o Khouja and Wang (2010) . On the contrary, downloading via P2P
etworks is an illegal activity which does not require money, but
nly effort. 
A continuum of consumers decides whether to legally acquire
usic at the store ( S ), to download it via P2P networks ( N ), or
ot to acquire it at all ( E ). A consumer’s decision in one period
etermines her type in the subsequent period. That is, at each
eriod, depending on the decision in the previous period, a con-
umer is of one of the three possible types: θ S (store), θN (net-
ork), or θE (empty). Note here that while our model does not
llow consumers to multi-home within a given period, consumers
an switch between platforms throughout time. The state at a cer-
ain period is deﬁned as the distribution of consumers over types.
etting the total mass of consumers equal to 1, the state space is
iven by 
= { (s, n, e ) ∈ R 3 + | s + n + e = 1 } , 
here s , n , and e represent the share of consumers of type θ S , θN ,
nd θE , respectively. A typical state in  is denoted by ω. 
Every period, given the current state ω, the ﬁrm sets a price for
ts product in the store p ( ω). This generates an immediate proﬁt
f 
(ω, p(ω)) = (p(ω) − μ) · d(ω, p(ω)) , 
here μ represents the cost of producing one unit and d ( ω , p ( ω ))
epresents the resulting demand, which equals the number of con-
umers choosing to buy the album in store given the current state
 and price p ( ω). Hence, in the next period the process will be
n a state with d ( ω , p ( ω )) consumers of type θ S . When design-
ng an optimal pricing policy, the ﬁrm realizes that the price cho-
en in the current state does not only affect the immediate proﬁt,
ut also the state transitions and thus potential proﬁts in the
uture. We assume the ﬁrm to be rational and farsighted. That
s, in any period, it sets the price as to maximize the present
alue of the stream of proﬁts discounted by a factor of δ each
eriod. 
Given the current market state ω and the ﬁrm’s price at this
tate p ( ω), the state transition is completely speciﬁed by the con-
umers’ decisions. We assume consumers to maximize their utility
n the current state. In her decision, a consumer takes into account
he price at the store, the downloading costs, and the switching
osts τ . The purpose of the switching costs τ in the model is to
romote consumer loyalties to the platforms, reﬂecting a possible
ock-in effect. 
In our model the downloading cost is negatively related to the
etwork size and the switching cost is incurred only when a con-
umer acquires the product while changing type. Hence, a con-
umer’s decision is determined by her type, the price at the store,
nd the network size. Given the current state ω = (s, n, e ) , the util-
ty of a consumer of type θ ∈ { θ S , θN , θE } who chooses an alterna-
ive x ∈ { S , N , E } is denoted by U ( θ , x ) and is deﬁned by 
(θS , x ) 
 
{ 
β − p(ω) + ε S if x = S (buy in store) 
γ − c(n ) − τ + ε N if x = N (download from network) 
0 + ε E if x = E (no acquisition at all) 
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t  (θN , x ) 
 
{ 
β − p(ω) − τ + ε S if x = S (buy in store) 
γ − c(n ) + ε N if x = N (download from network) 
0 + ε E if x = E (no acquisition at all) 
(θE , x ) 
 
{ 
β − p(ω) − τ + ε S if x = S (buy in store) 
γ − c(n ) − τ + ε N if x = N (download from network) 
0 + ε E if x = E (no acquisition at all). 
he parameters β > 0 and γ > 0 represent the basic utility of the
egal product and the illegally downloaded form, respectively. The
osts of downloading when the resulting network is of size n ∈ [0,
] are represented by c ( n ). A natural shape of this cost function is
or it to be decreasing in the network size at a diminishing rate.
his is due to the fact that the more users are sharing this ﬁle, the
asier it is to acquire it from the P2P network. 1 In our model we
mplement the following convex decreasing cost function: 
(n ) = σ
ρ + n , n ∈ [0 , 1] . 
ere σ > 0 represents the generic cost factor of downloading, in-
orporating a collection of factors that may affect downloading
osts; for instance, population computer literacy, the availability of
roadband Internet infrastructure, and most importantly, the de-
ree of legal enforcement of intellectual property rights. The pa-
ameter ρ > 0 inﬂuences the curvature of the cost function. The
maller ρ is, the steeper c ( n ) is around the region where n is close
o 0. Moreover, a positive ρ guarantees a ﬁnite price at a zero
etwork, capturing the idea that initial seeding peers are always
round, and giving opportunity for the network to further develop.
ote that ρ and σ are identical for all consumers and are indepen-
ent of the network size. 
Finally, the terms ε S , ε N , and ε E are random terms leading to
eterogeneous consumer behavior. These terms capture the addi-
ional (possibly negative) utility that a consumer obtains on top of
he basic utility of the physical, the illegally downloaded form, and
he outside options, respectively. We assume that these terms are
ndependently drawn according to a Gumbel extreme value dis-
ribution with location parameter 0 and scale parameter λ> 0 for
ach consumer and each of the three alternative choices every pe-
iod anew. The scale parameter λ is inversely related to the level
f heterogeneity among consumers’ preferences. 
Our speciﬁcation of consumers’ choice behavior corresponds to
he well-known logit model, the most widely used discrete choice
odel in applied work. Luce (1959) provides axiomatic foundations
or the logit model and shows that the logit model follows from
he axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom
tates that the ratio of the probabilities of selecting one alternative
ver another is not affected by the presence of other alternatives.
s argued by Train (2003) , choice probabilities that exhibit inde-
endence of irrelevant alternatives provide an accurate representa-
ion of reality in many settings. 
In our setup, the explicit function forms of the logit model are
s follows. Given the current state ω and the store’s price at this
tate p ( ω), the probability that a consumer with type θ is of type
x next period is then given by: 
 (θx | θ )[ ω, p(ω)] 
= exp (λU(θ, x )) 
exp (λU(θ, S)) + exp (λU(θ, N)) + exp (λU(θ, E)) , 
or θ ∈ { θ S , θN , θE } and x ∈ { S , N , E }. Hence, from state ω = (s, n, e )
ith price p ( ω), the process resumes in state ω ′ = (s ′ , n ′ , e ′ ) next1 Notice that unlike local area networks, contemporary P2P networks are less 
rone to network congestions. eriod, where 
s ′ = s · q (θS | θS ) n · q (θS | θN ) e · q (θS | θE ) = d(ω , p(ω )) , 
 
′ = s · q (θN | θS ) n · q (θN | θN ) e · q (θN | θE ) , 
e ′ = s · q (θE | θS ) n · q (θE | θN ) e · q (θE | θE ) . 
e denote this process of state transitions by Q :  × R + → . 
The ﬁrm maximizes the present value of all future proﬁts by
mplementing the pricing policy p :  → R + , which for all ω ∈ 
aximizes the value of 
 (ω, p) = π(ω , p(ω )) + δ ·V (Q(ω , p(ω )) , p) , 
he Bellman equation for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem. 
The ﬁrm’s search for the optimal pricing policy constitutes a
arkov decision problem. To solve this problem, we turn to nu-
erical methods. More precisely, we discretize the state space
nd apply a policy iteration algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal pricing
olicy. Details on the numerical method are further explained in
ection 3 . The process of state transitions that is induced by this
ricing policy provides insight in the implied market share dy-
amics. In our simulations, presented in later sections, the state
ransition process leads to a unique invariant distribution. The set
f states with positive probabilities in the invariant distribution is
alled the absorbing set. We refer to it as the long-run steady state
r just the steady state in the non-technical parts of the paper. 
. Numerical method 
In this section, we explain how the model described in
ection 2 is solved numerically. Firstly, we discretize the state
pace and adapt the ﬁrm’s problem accordingly. Next, we apply the
olicy iteration algorithm 2 on the discretized state space. Finally,
e apply a bracketing algorithm 3 to determine improvements in
ach state of the pricing policy. 
.1. Discretization 
wGiven a natural number k ≥1, we deﬁne the discretized state
pace by ̂ = { ( ̂  s ,̂ n , ̂  e ) ∈ K 3 | ̂  s + ̂  n + ̂  e = 1 } , 
here K = { 0 , 1 /k, 2 /k, . . . , 1 } . Fig. 1 illustrates the state space and
he discretized state space graphically for k = 4 . The large trian-
le represents the state space. The corner points of this triangle
epresent the extreme states with full consumer mass at either
tore, Network, or Empty. Each given point in the large triangle can
e written uniquely as a convex combination of the three corner
oints and the weight put on a corner point is equal to the prob-
bility mass the given point attaches to the corresponding plat-
orm. The triangulation of the triangle represents the discretized
tate space. The vertices are precisely the states in ̂ . 
Next, we deﬁne a transition mapping ̂ Q : ̂   × R + → P( ̂  ) on
his discretized state space, where P( ̂  ) denotes the set of prob-
bility distributions over ̂ . Given current state ̂ ω ∈ ̂   and pricing
olicy p : ̂  → R + the process resumes in state ω ′ = Q( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) .
ypically the new state ω ′ = (s ′ , n ′ , e ′ ) is not an element of ̂ . In
uch a case we allocate probabilities to the nearest states in ̂ 
uch that the expected value of the state is equal to ω ′ . The prob-
bility assigned to a state ̂ ω′ ∈ ̂  by the probability distribution̂ 
 ( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) is denoted by ̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) . 
In order to provide a precise formulation of the discretized
ransition mapping, it is convenient to deﬁne for a state ω ′ ∈  the2 See Howard (1960) , Blackwell (1965) , see also Judd (1998 , p. 416). 
3 Cf. Judd (1998) . 
332 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2018) 328–339 
S
E
N
•
ω′ a
c
b
• ab
c
ω′ = (s′, n′, e′) = ( 112 ,
1
3 ,
7
12)
a = (s′, n′, e′) = (14 , 14 , 12)
b = (s′, n′, e′) = (0, 12 , 12)
c = (s′, n′, e′) = (0, 14 , 34)
a = s′ − s′ = 112
b = n′ − n′ = 112
c = e′ − e′ = 112
Fig. 1. An illustration of the discretized state space and the discretized transition mapping. 
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fsets: 
(ω ′ ) = ch { ( s ′  , 	 n ′ 
 , 	 e ′ 
 ) , (	 s ′ 
 ,  n ′  , 	 e ′ 
 ) , (	 s ′ 
 , 	 n ′ 
 ,  e ′  ) }
∩ 
and 
∇(ω ′ ) = ch { (	 s ′ 
 ,  n ′  ,  e ′  ) , ( s ′  , 	 n ′ 
 ,  e ′  ) , ( s ′  ,  n ′  , 	 e ′ 
 ) }
∩ , 
where 	 x 
 (  x  ) refers to the nearest element in K less (larger)
than or equal to x and ch denotes the convex hull of a set. 
There are three possible cases. Either all of s ′ , n ′ , and e ′ are in-
teger multiples of 1/ k , or exactly one of them is an integer multiple
of 1/ k , or none of them is so. Since s ′ + n ′ + e ′ = 1 , it is not possi-
ble that exactly two of them are integer multiples of 1/ k . 
In the ﬁrst case, it holds that ω ′ ∈ ̂ , so is a vertex of the tri-
angulated state space, and (ω ′ ) = ∇(ω ′ ) = { ω ′ } . 
In the second case, consider the subcase where s ′ is an inte-
ger multiple of 1/ k , whereas n ′ and e ′ are not. We will restrict
attention to this subcase, since the other two subcases are sim-
ilar. It holds that s ′ + 	 n ′ 
 +  e ′  = 1 and that s ′ +  n ′  + 	 e ′ 
 =
1 , whereas s ′ + 	 n ′ 
 + 	 e ′ 
 = 1 − 1 /k and s ′ +  n ′  +  e ′  = 1 + 1 /k,
so both ( s ′ , 	 n ′ 
 , 	 e ′ 
 ) and ( s ′ ,  n ′  ,  e ′  ) do not belong to . Since
( ω ′ ) and ∇( ω ′ ) are subsets of , we have that 
(ω ′ ) = ∇(ω ′ ) = ch { (s ′ , 	 n ′ 
 ,  e ′  ) , (s ′ ,  n ′  , 	 e ′ 
 ) } , 
so ω ′ is on an edge. 
In the third case, there are two subcases. It holds that ei-
ther 	 s ′ 
 + 	 n ′ 
 + 	 e ′ 
 = 1 − 1 /k or 	 s ′ 
 + 	 n ′ 
 + 	 e ′ 
 = 1 − 2 /k. In
the ﬁrst subcase, it holds that  s ′  + 	 n ′ 
 + 	 e ′ 
 = 1 , 	 s ′ 
 +  n ′  +
	 e ′ 
 = 1 , and 	 s ′ 
 + 	 n ′ 
 +  e ′  = 1 , and ω ′ belongs to ( ω ′ ). In
the second subcase, it holds that  s ′  +  n ′  + 	 e ′ 
 = 1 ,  s ′  +
	 n ′ 
 +  e ′  = 1 , and 	 s ′ 
 +  n ′  +  e ′  = 1 , and ω ′ belongs to
∇( ω ′ ). 
Contingent on ω ′ being in ( ω ′ ) or ∇( ω ′ ), we specify the dis-
cretized transition probabilities. If ω ′ = Q( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) is an element
of ( ω ′ ), then the probability ̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) that state ̂ ω′ is
reached when price p( ̂  ω) is chosen at state ̂ ω is given by 
̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
k · (s ′ − 	 s ′ 
 ) if ̂ ω′ = ( s ′  , 	 n ′ 
 , 	 e ′ 
 ) 
k · (n ′ − 	 n ′ 
 ) if ̂ ω′ = (	 s ′ 
 ,  n ′  , 	 e ′ 
 ) 
k · (e ′ − 	 e ′ 
 ) if ̂ ω′ = (	 s ′ 
 , 	 n ′ 
 ,  e ′  ) 
0 otherwise . 
If ω ′ = Q( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) is an element of ∇( ω ′ ), then 
̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎩ 
k · ( s ′  − s ′ ) if ̂ ω′ = (	 s ′ 
 ,  n ′  ,  e ′  ) 
k · ( n ′  − n ′ ) if ̂ ω′ = ( s ′  , 	 n ′ 
 ,  e ′  ) 
k · ( e ′  − e ′ ) if ̂ ω′ = ( s ′  ,  n ′  , 	 e ′ 
 ) 
0 otherwise . 
For the ﬁrst of the two contingencies, the situation is illustrated
graphically in Fig. 1 . We show next that the expected value of the probability distri-
ution on the discretized state space is equal to ω ′ , so ∑ 
̂ ′ ∈ ̂  
̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) ̂  ω′ = Q( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) = ω ′ . 
or ω ′ ∈ ( ω ′ ), it holds that the left-hand size in the above expres-
ion is equal to 
 · (s ′ − 	 s ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝  s 
′  
	 n ′ 
 
	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ + k · (n ′ − 	 n ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 
 n ′  
	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ 
+ k · (e ′ − 	 e ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 
	 n ′ 
 
 e ′  
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ 
= k · (s ′ − 	 s ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 + 1 
k 	 n ′ 
 
	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ 
+ k · (n ′ − 	 n ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 
	 n ′ 
 + 1 
k 	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ + k · (e ′ − 	 e ′ 
 ) ·
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 
	 n ′ 
 
	 e ′ 
 + 1 
k 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ 
= 
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ 	 s 
′ 
 
	 n ′ 
 
	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ + 
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ s 
′ − 	 s ′ 
 
n ′ − 	 n ′ 
 
e ′ − 	 e ′ 
 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ = 
⎛ ⎜ ⎝ s 
′ 
n ′ 
e ′ 
⎞ ⎟ ⎠ , 
here the second equality makes use of the fact that (s ′ − 	 s ′ 
 ) +
(n ′ − 	 n ′ 
 ) + (e ′ − 	 e ′ 
 ) = 1 /k. The derivation for ω ′ ∈ ∇( ω ′ ) is
nalogous. 
.2. Existence 
The next question is whether an optimal pricing policy exists
or the Markov decision problem with state space ̂ , action set R + 
n each state, and transitions as determined by ̂ Q . Unfortunately,
he unboundedness of the action set means that standard existence
esults like for instance Theorem 6.2.10 in Puterman (1994) cannot
e applied. Nevertheless, existence of an optimal pricing policy can
e established by the following argument. 
For every state ̂ ω, consider ﬁrst the highest price p ( ̂  ω) that
ould maximize the ﬁrm’s instantaneous proﬁts. The continuity of
he instantaneous proﬁts in p( ̂  ω) , the fact that instantaneous prof-
ts are strictly positive for every p( ̂  ω) > μ, and, since λ> 0, the
onvergence of instantaneous proﬁts to zero if p( ̂  ω) → ∞ , guaran-
ees that such a price exists. We show that p ( ̂  ω) is an upper bound
or the price set by the optimal pricing policy in state ̂ ω. 
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4 See Judd (1998 , p. 94). We call the real-valued vector v with components indexed bŷ ∈ ̂   monotonic if for every ̂ ω1 = (s 1 , n 1 , e 1 ) and ̂ ω2 = (s 2 , n 2 , e 2 )
uch that s 1 ≤ s 2 , n 1 ≥n 2 , and e 1 ≥ e 2 it holds that v ̂ ω1 ≤ v ̂ ω2 . The
et of all monotonic vectors v is denoted by M . Monotonic v ’s arise
aturally in our model, since states with higher market shares for
he ﬁrm, a smaller P2P network, and a smaller unserved market,
re more attractive for the ﬁrm. 
We argue next that for every ̂ ω ∈ ̂  , for every monotonic v , 
max 
p( ̂  ω) ∈ R + 
π( ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) + δ
∑ 
̂ ω′ ∈ ̂  
̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p( ̂  ω)) v ̂ ω′ (1)
xists. Our functional forms are such that a higher price leads
o higher transition probabilities to states with lower values of s
nd higher values of n and e . Monotonicity of v then implies that
p( ̂  ω) leads to a lower value of the expression in (1) than p ( ̂  ω) if
p( ̂  ω) > p ( ̂  ω) . The continuity of the expression in (1) in p( ̂  ω) and
he compactness of [0 , p ( ̂  ω)] implies that the maximum exists. We
enote the maximum by L ̂ ω(v ) and the vector of maxima across
tates in ̂  by L (v ) . 
Consider some v ∈ M, two states ̂ ω1 = (s 1 , n 1 , e 1 ) and ̂ ω2 =
(s 2 , n 2 , e 2 ) such that s 1 ≤ s 2 , n 1 ≥n 2 , and e 1 ≥ e 2 , and let
p ∗( ̂  ω1 ) be a price that maximizes the expression in (1) . Since
( ̂  ω2 , p 
∗( ̂  ω1 )) ≥ π( ̂  ω1 , p ∗( ̂  ω1 )) and the transitions from ̂ ω2 in-
uced by p ∗( ̂  ω1 ) are to states with higher values of s and lower
alues of n and e than the transitions from ̂ ω1 induced by p ∗( ̂  ω1 ) ,
onotonicity of v implies that 
( ̂  ω2 , p 
∗( ̂  ω1 )) + δ
∑ 
̂ ω∈ ̂  
Q( ̂  ω | ̂  ω2 , p ∗( ̂  ω1 )) v ̂ ω ≥ π( ̂  ω1 , p ∗( ̂  ω1 )) 
+ δ
∑ 
̂ ω∈ ̂  
Q( ̂  ω | ̂  ω1 , p ∗( ̂  ω1 )) v ̂ ω = L ̂ ω1 (v ) , 
nd therefore that L ̂ ω2 (v ) ≥ L ̂ ω1 (v ) . The function L therefore maps
 into M . 
It follows from standard arguments in the literature on Markov
ecision processes, see Theorem 6.2.3 in Puterman (1994) , that L
s a contraction mapping, so has a unique ﬁxed point, and that a
xed point of L corresponds to an optimal pricing policy, see The-
rem 6.2.3 in Puterman (1994) . We have therefore shown the exis-
ence of an optimal pricing policy. It also holds that randomized or
on-stationary policies do not lead to higher values of the objec-
ive function than the optimal deterministic stationary policy, see
heorem 5.5.3b and Proposition 6.2.1 in Puterman (1994) . 
.3. Policy iteration algorithm 
We present an algorithm to approximate the optimal pricing
olicy for the discretized state space. 
Policy iteration algorithm 
nitialize Choose stopping criterion ξ > 0 and an arbitrary starting policy 
p 0 : ̂   → R + . 
Set i = 1 . 
oop 1. Compute the present value of p i −1 for each possible starting state in ̂ . 
That is, solve the system of linear equations 
V ( ̂  ω, p i −1 ) = π( ̂  ω, p i −1 ( ̂  ω)) + δ ·
∑ ̂ ω′ ∈ ̂  ̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, p i −1 ( ̂  ω)) ·V ( ̂  ω′ , p i −1 ) . 
2. Improve the policy for each state in ̂ . 
That is, solve for each state ̂  ω the problem 
p i ( ̂  ω) := argmax z π( ̂  ω, z) + δ ·
∑ ̂ ω′ ∈ ̂  ̂ Q ( ̂  ω′ | ̂  ω, z) ·V ( ̂  ω′ , p i −1 ) . 
3. Terminate loop if the improvement is negligible: 
if ‖ p i − p i −1 ‖ ∞ < ξ : 
then Terminate loop and return p i as the optimal pricing policy. 
else Increase i with one and resume at step 1. 
In step 2 of the loop, given a certain policy, the optimal one-
hot deviation with respect to this policy is determined for each
ossible state. The stationary pricing policy that is composed from
he state prices that induce optimal one-shot improvements guar-
ntees at least the same present value for each possible startingtate and, hence, is a better pricing policy relative to the previ-
us one. This is based on two arguments. First, a one-shot im-
rovement in a state leads to a stationary improvement when-
ver this state occurs. Second, any improvement implemented in
ne state implies a weak improvement in all other states. From
he one-deviation principle it follows that once no (non-negligible)
mprovement can be found, an (almost) optimal pricing policy is
eached. To sum up, any iteration throughout the running of the
olicy iteration algorithm guarantees an improvement and, once
he algorithm terminates, it returns a (nearly) optimal pricing pol-
cy. 
The loop terminates when the change in the pricing pol-
cy ‖ p i − p i −1 ‖ ∞ is less than or equal to the stopping crite-
ion ξ , where by deﬁnition of the inﬁnity norm ‖ p i − p i −1 ‖ ∞ =
ax ̂ ω∈ ̂   | p i ( ̂  ω) − p i −1 ( ̂  ω) | . That is, the loop terminates when there
s no state for which the price has changed by more than ξ during
he respective iteration. A smaller value for ξ leads the algorithm
o terminate with a better approximation of the optimal pricing
olicy. 
In our numerical derivations, we used a bracketing algorithm to
umerically solve the maximization problems in step 2 at every it-
ration. 4 The procedure underlying this algorithm is analogous to
he bisection algorithm for root-solving. Whereas the bisection al-
orithm starts with two initial points with unequal sign, the brack-
ting algorithm starts with three initial points (say, x 1 , y 1 , and z 1 
ith x 1 < y 1 < z 1 ) with the property that the function value is high-
st at the middle point y 1 . Next, at every iteration, the midpoint of
he largest of the two intervals that are determined by the three
oints (i.e., [ x 1 , y 1 ] and [ y 1 , z 1 ]) is taken. If the function value at
he midpoint m is less than the function value at the middle point
 1 , then the larger interval is bisected (i.e., ( x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) := ( m , y 1 ,
 1 ) or ( x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) := ( x 1 , y 1 , m ) depending on whether the ﬁrst or
he second interval is the largest). Otherwise, the smaller interval
s dropped (i.e., ( x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) := ( x 1 , m , y 1 ) or ( x 2 , y 2 , z 2 ) := ( y 1 , m ,
 1 ) depending on whether the ﬁrst or the second interval is the
argest). This procedure is iterated until the search area has shrunk
o a size less than a predeﬁned tolerance level. 
One challenge towards implementing the bracketing algorithm
s to ﬁnd three starting points x 1 , y 1 , and z 1 with the property
hat function value is highest at y 1 . We take x 1 equal to 0. For
 1 we take any price suﬃciently high such that the correspond-
ng function value is less than the function value at z 1 /2. Such a
rice is guaranteed to exist. We need to determine a middle point
 1 such that the function value at y 1 exceeds the function value at
 1 and z 1 . The function value at a price equal to (x 1 + z 1 ) / 2 = z 1 / 2
s above the function value at z 1 by our choice of z 1 . If the function
alue at z 1 /2 is above the function value at x 1 = 0 , then we take y 1 
qual to z 1 /2. Otherwise, the function value at x 1 = 0 is above the
unction value at z 1 and we consider a price equal to z 1 /4. If the
unction value at z 1 /4 is above the function value at x 1 = 0 , then
e take y 1 equal to z 1 /4. Otherwise, we consider a price equal to
 1 /8. We continue in this fashion and will either end up at some
teration j such that y 1 = z 1 / 2 j or z 1 /2 j < ξ . In the ﬁrst case, a triple
ith the desired properties is found and the bracketing algorithm
s started; in the second case, a price of zero is optimal in the given
tate at the given iteration. 
. Model calibration and benchmark outcomes 
In order for the model to generate meaningful real-life insights,
e calibrate the parameters to be consistent with real-life data.
he model contains two types of parameters. The ﬁrst type are
hose whose values are directly retrievable from consumer surveys
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Table 1 
Legal sales. 
1999 20 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Physical CDs (million $) 12816.3 13214.5 12909.4 12044.1 11232.9 11446.5 10520.2 9372.6 7452.3 
Digital singles (million $) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 138.0 363.3 580.6 801.6 
Digital albums (million $) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.5 135.7 275.9 424.9 
Total legal sales (million $) 12816.3 13214.5 12909.4 12044.1 11232.9 11630.0 11019.2 10229.1 8678.8 
Number physical CDs (million) 938.9 942.5 881.9 803.3 746.0 767.0 705.4 619.7 511.1 
Number total legal sales (million) 938.9 942.5 881.9 803.3 746.0 779.3 738.9 676.3 595.2 
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w  and ﬁnancial statements. The second type are not directly retriev-
able and are calibrated in order for the model outcomes to ﬁt real-
life data on market outcomes. We adopt two benchmark scenarios:
the situation before P2P was made available to the public and the
situation when legal digital sales started to soar. More precisely,
we take the years 1999 and 2007 for calibration. This allows us to
analyze the order of magnitude of the societal impacts of the P2P
networks on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumers’ welfare in that period.
Thus, in this model, we speak of numbers in dollar terms. 
4.1. Data and evidence 
First of all, we start with the CD prices over the years. Accord-
ing to the aggregate data from RIAA (2007) , the average price of a
CD in the U.S. has been kept at around $14 over the years. How-
ever, the real prices, if one takes inﬂation into account, have shown
minor ﬂuctuations with a mildly decreasing trend. In our model,
therefore, we should ﬁnd CD prices at a level around $13. 
Next we turn to CD sales. Table 1 presents some key ﬁgures
coming from the year-end report from RIAA (2009) . According to
these numbers, the record companies shipped about 938.9 million
copies of CDs to the consumers in the year 1999. Up to 2007, le-
gal digital sales were still not very signiﬁcant. For instance, RIAA
(2009) reports that the market value of digitally downloaded sin-
gles in 2007 was equal to $801.6 million, digitally downloaded al-
bums $424.9 million, whereas the market value of physical CDs
was equal to $7452.3 million. Digital sales soared by 30% in 2008,
while physical sales plummeted by 27% in that year. Since the mar-
ket structure has changed so signiﬁcantly in 2008, we limit our
calculations to the period starting in 1999 and ending in 2007. The
RIAA (2009) report reveals that in 2007 the equivalent of 595.2
million CDs were sold legally. This suggests that the CD sales have
decreased by about 32% in 8 years. This implies that in our model,
the sales in the store in the last period should be about 68% of
those in the ﬁrst period. 
Finally, the P2P network size. Napster was introduced to the
general public in the year 1999. We therefore take the network size
in the year 1999 to be 0. Now the question is: how many albums
are being downloaded via P2P networks in 2007? Siwek (2007) ,
based on a report by the IFPI, makes an estimate of 20 billion il-
legal downloads worldwide for 2006 versus 2.3 billion legally sold
physical, implying that n / s is around 9 in 20 06. IFPI (20 08) reports
that in 2007 “Tens of billions of illegal music ﬁles are traded an-
nually worldwide at an estimated ratio of 20 illegal downloads for
every track sold,” yielding an estimate for n / s equal to 20 in 2007.
In the calculations resulting from the calibrated model, we will aim
at a value of n / s of 16 for 2007, which is in between the two re-
ported values and a bit closer to that reported for 2007. 
4.2. Parameter calibration 
The survey reported in Rob and Waldfogel (2006) indicates that
in the period December 2003 and February 2004 the average will-
ingness to pay of purchased CDs was around $15.91. This means
that the parameter β should be set such that the gross valuationf CDs purchased in 2003, that includes the random term ( εS ) and
ventual switching costs, is close to this number. We ﬁnd that for
= 11 , we obtain a gross valuation of purchased CDs equal to
15.75 at the state and price in 2003 (as presented in Table 3 ),
hich is very close to the number reported in the survey. Since
e have no reason to believe that the consumption value of il-
egally downloaded music is very different from the consumption
alue of a legally acquired CD, we set γ equal to β for the sit-
ation with P2P. Indeed, there exist consumers that regard a le-
al product more valuable than an illegal one, because of ensured
uality, the possibility of loss of private information and being in-
ected by viruses when dealing with P2P sites, etc. However, there
lso exist many consumers that prefer illegal digital versions to le-
al physical ones for various reasons, including portability, ease in
xchange, ability to play on multiple devices, and no need to ac-
uire (multiple) peripheral hardware. Via the error terms in our
ogistic choice framework, our model allows for both types of con-
umers. To obtain the starting scenario of the year 1999, we take
= −10 0 0 , implying that the probability of a consumer choosing
he P2P network is approximately equal to zero. This is simply a
odeling trick to obtain the situation without a P2P network as a
pecial case of our model. 
In a study done by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) , the authors
how a report from IFPI that explains the break-down of the aver-
ge cost of a CD. This can be estimated to be about €13 including
axes. However, since in our model we look at all ﬁgures in dol-
ar terms, it follows that the per unit cost μ in our model should
e around $10. The discount factor δ can be taken safely as 0.95
ccording to the convention of an interest rate equal to approxi-
ately 5%. 
The generic cost factor of downloading σ and the parameter
hat captures the curvature of the downloading cost function ρ are
odel speciﬁc and we choose ρ = 0 . 025 and σ = 0 . 5 to get a real-
stic speciﬁcation of downloading costs. Since the cost function is
(n ) = σ/ (n + ρ) , this implies that when no one is using the net-
ork, it costs $20 to download an album, which is more expensive
han buying it in the store. However, when 7.5% of the total mar-
et downloads an album, the downloading cost drops signiﬁcantly
o $5, which might be tempting for many consumers, though not
ll. As around half of the market downloads, the cost drops fur-
her towards $1, which makes it seriously attractive for everyone.
inally, when the whole population downloads, the cost drops to
he minimum of about $0.5. 
The consumer heterogeneity parameter λ and the switching
ost τ are determined by calibration and are chosen such that
oth the store and the network achieve realistic quantities in both
enchmark scenarios. The quantities we want to match are the re-
lized sales ratio s 2007 /s 1999 = 595 . 2 / 938 . 9 = 0 . 63 and the network
o sales ratio in 2007, n 2007 /s 2007 = 16 . We choose a grid of po-
ential values for λ and τ . For each ( λ, τ ) pair we compute the
ptimal pricing policy in the absence of the P2P network and de-
ermine the steady state of 1999 in the absence of the P2P network
y iterating the resulting matrix of transition probabilities. Next we
ompute the optimal pricing policy in the presence of the P2P net-
ork and use that policy and the steady state of 1999 to compute
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Table 2 
Parameter description and values before and after P2P. 
Parameter Description Before P2P After P2P 
β Utility legal product 11 11 
γ Utility illegal download −10 0 0 11 
σ Generic cost factor of downloading 0.5 0.5 
ρ Cost function parameter 0.025 0.025 
τ Switching costs 12 12 
λ Homogeneity of consumers’ preferences 0.28 0.28 
δ Discount factor 0.95 0.95 
μ Per unit production costs 10 10 
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Fig. 2. Pricing policy without P2P. 
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Fig. 3. Price policy with P2P. Prices are plotted as a function of the ﬁrm’s market 
share for different values of network size. 
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a  he resulting n 2007 / s 2007 . This leads to values for λ of 0.28 and τ
f 12. 
Table 2 summarizes the chosen parameter values with all prices
eing in dollar terms. 
. Model outcomes and analysis 
The numerical method presented in Section 3 is programmed
nto a series of Matlab routines. 5 We ran the resulting program
sing the parameter values of Table 2 . For the discretization, we
pt for a grid size of 1/50, i.e. k = 50 ; the tolerance level for the
ricing policy to convergence is set to 4 digits after the decimal
or the maximum state-wise difference between consecutive iter-
tions. 6 We obtain outcomes such as pricing policy, proﬁts, state
ynamics, probability distribution over states, and welfare. 
We start by computing the optimal pricing policy in 1999;
hat is, before the introduction of P2P. Fig. 2 indicates the prices
harged by the ﬁrm in the different states in the year 1999 before
2P was available. Since this case corresponds to γ = −10 0 0 , the
alue of s is a suﬃcient state variable for the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm charges
igher prices in the states where it has higher market shares in a
onotonic fashion. This seems natural given the presence of the
witching cost. 
Regardless of which distribution of states we start the Markov
rocess from, given the optimal pricing policy and the induced
rocess of state-transitions, we always end up in a unique steady
tate distribution. In this steady state, it holds that s = 0 . 032 , the
etwork size is n = 0 by construction, and e = 0 . 968 . The low value
f s reﬂects that without the P2P network much less music is ac-
uired by the consumers. The expected steady-state price charged
y the ﬁrm is $12.79. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy after the in-
roduction of P2P, by plotting the ﬁrm’s price choices as a func-ion of its market share for ﬁve different values of the network 
5 The Matlab routines are available upon request. 
6 The tolerance level of the bracketing algorithm for policy improvement is set to 
 digits after the decimal. 
d  
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p  ize ( n ∈ {0.00, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80}). Generally the ﬁrm’s price
s, for given network size, increasing in its market share. It follows
rom the ﬁgure that for a given market share of the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s
ricing is typically non-monotonic in the size of the network. As
n example, for s = 0 . 30 , it holds that the price is highest when
 = 0 . 20 , followed by n = 0 . 60 , n = 0 . 40 , and n = 0 . 00 . 
The two main forces at work are the following. Setting a low
rice leads to low instantaneous proﬁts, but by attracting cus-
omers away from the P2P network, to higher future market shares
nd thereby higher future proﬁts. Setting a high price leads to high
nstantaneous proﬁts by exploiting the installed customer base, but
t the same time accommodates the network, leading to lower fu-
ure market shares and thereby lower future proﬁts. Since, given
he size of the P2P network, all the curves are increasing, the larger
he market share of the ﬁrm, the higher it sets its price, so the ex-
loitation of the installed customer base dominates. Since, given
he market share of the ﬁrm, a larger P2P network is more attrac-
ive because of the lower downloading cost, dynamic considera-
ions to ﬁght the network in order to gain market share tend to
ecome less and less important when the network grows. 
At a state with n = 0 , the prices charged in the presence of P2P
re lower than before P2P was introduced, in line with standard
redictions if a competitor with a close substitute enters the mar-
et. 
Table 3 shows the evolution of the model’s endogenous vari-
bles resulting from the introduction of P2P. The columns are ar-
anged in years and the rows show the model outcomes, where p ,
, cs , and w stand for price, proﬁt, consumer surplus, and welfare,
espectively. The dynamics are obtained from following the Markov
rocess induced by the optimal pricing policy p ∗ of the situation
fter the introduction of P2P, while starting from the steady state
istribution of the situation before the introduction of P2P. Notice
hat the numbers refer to weighted averages of the state outcomes,
here the weight on a particular state is the probability that this
tate is visited in the respective year. All numbers, except for the
rices, are obtained by multiplying the values of the model out-
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Table 3 
Evolution of market outcomes over years. All quantities, except prices, are scaled to market values, as 
described in the main text. 
1999 20 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
p ($) 12.79 12.75 12.78 12.82 12.84 12.87 12.87 12.87 12.87 
s (billions) 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.69 0.62 
n (billions) 0.00 0.08 0.23 0.62 1.61 3.29 5.37 7.56 9.69 
π ($ billions) 2.62 2.60 2.58 2.50 2.35 2.17 1.97 1.77 1.59 
cs ($ billions) 64.21 64.79 65.50 69.25 84.77 111.11 138.36 163.53 186.21 
w ($ billions) 66.83 67.39 68.08 71.85 87.12 113.28 140.33 165.30 187.80 
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Fig. 4. Annual total legal sales (black; left y -axis) and average prices (gray; right 
y -axis) during 1999–2007 on the basis of actual numbers (solid) and the model 
predictions (dotted). 
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t  comes with a factor of 29.3 billion. This scaler is estimated by tak-
ing the ratio between the total CD sales of 938.9 million according
to the RIAA’s year end report, and the CD sales quantity s of 0.032
in our model in 1999. 7 
The computation of proﬁts π , consumer surplus cs , and total
welfare w is as follows. Let P be the probability distribution on
states in ̂  in a particular year. Then we have 
π = ∑ ̂ ω∈ ̂   P ( ̂  ω) · (p ∗( ̂  ω) − μ) · d( ̂  ω, p ∗( ̂  ω)) . 
The consumer surplus is computed at the expected state ˜ ω and the
expected price ˜ p : 8 
˜ ω = ∑ 
̂ ω∈ ̂  
P ( ̂  ω) · ̂ ω, 
˜ p = ∑ 
̂ ω∈ ̂  
P ( ̂  ω) · p ∗( ̂  ω) . 
We ﬁrst determine the conditional consumer surplus at his ex-
pected state ˜ ω = ( ˜  s ,˜ n, ˜  e ) and price ˜ p on being of type θ S , θN , and
θE , denoted respectively by cs S ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) , cs N ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) , and cs E ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) : 
cs S ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) = 
∫ 
(ε S ,ε N ,ε E ) 
max { β − ˜ p + ε S , γ − c( ˜  n ) 
−τ + ε N , ε E } d F (ε S , ε N , ε E ) , 
cs N ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) = 
∫ 
(ε S ,ε N ,ε E ) 
max { β − ˜ p − τ + ε S , γ
−c( ˜  n ) + ε N , ε E } d F (ε S , ε N , ε E ) , 
cs E ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) = 
∫ 
(ε S ,ε N ,ε E ) 
max { β − ˜ p − τ + ε S , γ − c( ˜  n ) 
−τ + ε N , ε E } d F (ε S , ε N , ε E ) , 
where F is the joint distribution where the three error-terms are
identically and independently distributed according to a Gumbel
extreme value distribution with location parameter 0 and scale pa-
rameter λ. We compute the integrals by means of simulations in-
volving 9 million random draws. Consumer surplus is now equal
to 
cs = ˜  s · cs S ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) + ˜  n · cs N ( ˜  ω, ˜  p ) + ˜  e · cs E ( ˜  ω, ˜  p )) . 
Total welfare follows from the addition of consumer surplus to
proﬁts, 
w = π + cs. 
The years 1999 and 2007 were used to calibrate some of the
model’s parameters; so the match with real-life ﬁgures in these7 Estimations of the total market size in a similar manner for the period 20 0 0–
2007 yield the values 29.1, 27.1, 24.9, 23.8, 26.2, 27.5, 28.7 and 29.6 billion, respec- 
tively. We believe the changes in estimated total market sizes are within a band- 
width that we feel comfortable using the ﬁxed ﬁgure of 29.3 billion. 
8 An alternative way of deriving the consumer surplus is to ﬁrst compute the 
consumer surplus in each discrete state, and next take the weighted average of 
the resulting consumer surpluses using the probability distribution on states as the 
weights. We opted for the computationally least expensive method in which inte- 
grals over random shocks need to be evaluated in one state only. 
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i  wo periods is quite accurate. The remaining numbers in the ta-
le are outcomes of the model, but nevertheless provide quite a
ood ﬁt to the real-life ﬁgures as far as they are available. To visu-
lize some similarities, Fig. 4 presents the annual total legal sales
nd average prices during 1999–2007 on the basis of actual num-
ers (taken from Table 1 ) and the model predictions (taken from
able 3 ). Surprisingly, the model’s outcomes capture the anomaly
f the CD sales increase in 20 0 0, before sales start to drop. The
rice chosen by the ﬁrm in 20 0 0 is somewhat below the one of
999, which causes sales to increase. In these years, the size of the
2P network is still so small that the ﬁrm beneﬁts from setting
ow prices, thereby delaying the development of the network, and
ncreasing the future proﬁts of the ﬁrm. 
Now, let us scrutinize some of the key numbers across the
ears. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt decreases steadily over the years. By the
ear 2007, this decrease had led to a huge loss of $1.0 billion in
nnual proﬁts, according to the model’s estimation. Consumer sur-
lus, however, increases in the same period by some $122.0 billion
er annum. As a result of that, total welfare beneﬁts by around
121.0 billion per annum. 
So far we have assumed the P2P network to cause positive net-
ork externalities. As an exercise, we could consider the model for
he case where downloading costs are equal to a constant c , so in-
ependent of the size of the P2P network. Notice that this case
s equivalent to simply decreasing γ by the amount c and having
ero downloading costs. We take c equal to 0.5519, the steady state
alue of per capita downloading costs, and present the resulting
volution of market outcomes in Table 4 . 
Without positive network externalities, the ratio of n to s is 20
n 20 0 0, so higher than our estimated 20 07 size of 16, only one
ear after the introduction of P2P. Already in 2001, the P2P net-
ork would have surpassed the estimated real size of the network
n 2007. Very similar effects occur for the sales at the store. With
P.J.-J. Herings et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2018) 328–339 337 
Table 4 
Evolution of market outcomes over years in the absence of positive network externalities. 
1999 20 0 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
p ($) 12.79 13.04 12.96 12.88 12.83 12.79 12.77 12.76 12.75 
s (billions) 0.94 0.57 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10 
n (billions) 0.00 11.29 17.65 21.22 23.23 24.37 25.00 25.36 25.56 
π ($ billions) 2.62 1.10 0.74 0.53 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 
cs ($ billions) 64.21 213.99 269.78 301.17 318.82 328.75 334.33 337.48 339.25 
w ($ billions) 66.83 215.09 270.52 301.70 319.24 329.11 334.66 337.78 339.53 
Table 5 
Elasticities of steady state outcomes for variables in the rows with re- 
spect to the parameters in the columns; without P2P. 
β τ λ μ
p −0 . 0391 −0 . 0511 −0 . 2706 0.8248 
s 4.3531 −2 . 9281 −2 . 5469 −3 . 8094 
π 4.1387 −3 . 1286 −3 . 7327 −3 . 6096 
cs 0.2756 −0 . 1671 −1 . 1318 −0 . 2398 
w 0.4277 −0 . 2839 −1 . 2345 −0 . 3719 
c  
p  
w  
d  
2  
p
a  
b  
t
6
 
t  
c
 
s  
n  
(  
T  
s  
o  
s  
t  
p  
n  
a  
i  
t
 
s  
t  
w  
s
a  
i  
a  
i  
m  
a  
f  
o  
h  
i  
p  
i  
i  
t
 
o  
t  
o  
o  
e  
l  
t  
d  
i
n  
o  
h  
i  
p  
f
 
s  
d  
u  
i  
l  
t  
(  
(  
e  
r  
m  
ﬁ  onstant downloading costs, the ﬁrm’s sales would already have
lummeted to a level of 568.4 million in the year 20 0 0, already
ay below actual sales of 595.2 million in 2007. With constant
ownloading costs, the model predicts only 102.6 million sales for
007. The results coming out of the model for 2007 could be im-
roved by signiﬁcantly increasing the value of switching costs τ
bove $11 or downloading costs c above 0.5519. Apart from not
eing realistic, such a change would not capture the dynamics of
he network and the ﬁrm’s market share in any accurate way. 
. Comparative statics 
The previous section focused on the market outcomes across
he years 1999–2007. This section analyzes the effects of small
hanges in the parameters on the steady state market outcomes. 
As a reference point, the comparative statics of the benchmark’s
tarting state in 1999 without P2P are presented in Table 5 . The
umbers in the cells refer to the elasticities of market outcomes
in rows) with respect to the model’s parameters (in columns).
able 6 presents the comparative statics at the steady state re-
ulting from the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing policy after the appearance
f P2P. The steady state in the presence of P2P is computed by
tarting from the steady state without P2P in 1999 and iterating
he matrix of transition probabilities corresponding to the optimal
ricing policy in the presence of P2P. The elasticities are computed
umerically, i.e. by changing the parameter concerned by a small
mount, computing the new optimal pricing policy and the result-
ng new steady state, and using these values to derive the elastici-
ies of interest. 
The intuition behind the numbers in Table 5 compares well to
tandard intuitions of a monopoly analysis. Meanwhile, according
o Table 6 , the model outcomes are generally most sensitive to-
ards changes in the parameters β , γ , λ, and μ. In particular,Table 6 
Elasticities of steady state outcomes for variables in t
columns; with P2P. 
β γ σ ρ
p −0 . 1525 0.0310 −0 . 0018 0.0 0
s 4.5938 −4 . 5313 0.3125 −0 .
n −0 . 0207 0.5496 −0 . 0363 0.00
π 4.0326 −4 . 3696 0.2935 −0 .
cs −0 . 0095 1.2219 −0 . 0673 0.00
w −0 . 0066 1.2177 −0 . 0670 0.00ales quantity and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt show a substantial increase in β
nd decrease in γ , λ, and μ. The sign of these elasticities is fairly
ntuitive as β and γ represent the valuation of the legal product
nd the illegal downloads, respectively, and μ the cost of produc-
ng one unit of the legal product. The value of λ reﬂects the ho-
ogeneity of the consumers’ preferences. Since downloading costs
re much lower than production costs, when consumers are per-
ectly homogeneous, they would all use the P2P network, which
bviously would be bad for the ﬁrm. Less intuitive is the fact that
igher per unit cost μ increases consumer and total surplus. This
s due to the fact that a higher production cost induces a higher
rice, which encourages consumers to download and consequently
mplies a gain in consumer surplus because of positive download-
ng externalities. As one would expect, this effect does not exist in
he case before P2P was introduced, see Table 5 . 
The signs of all elasticities with respect to β are exactly the
pposite of the signs of the corresponding elasticities with respect
o γ . The intuition for β and γ having an opposite effect is quite
bvious, with the exception of the negative effect of the valuation
f the legal product on consumer surplus and total welfare. This
ffect can be explained by the fact that a higher valuation of the
egal product induces consumers to switch from the P2P network
o the store, thereby making it more costly to download for those
ownloaders who stay in the network as a consequence of the pos-
tive network externalities. Again, without the presence of P2P, β
aturally has a positive effect on the consumer surplus. The effects
f β and γ on the price of the legal product are counterintuitive. A
igher value of β decreases p while a higher value of γ increases
t. As we will explain in more detail later on, this is due to the
rice elasticity of demand for the legal product given the convex
unctional form of the cost of downloading. 
The model outcomes are relatively inelastic with respect to the
witching cost τ , with the exception of proﬁts π . A higher τ in-
uces a decrease in all of the predicted market outcomes. In partic-
lar, switching costs have a negative effect on the prices and prof-
ts indicating that, for the calibrated values, our model predicts the
ong term incentive to attract new consumers (‘investment effect’)
o dominate the short term incentive to harvest loyal consumers
‘harvesting effect’). The literature on switching costs, see Cabral
2009) and Arie and Grieco (2014) , has argued that the investment
ffect dominates when switching costs are low. Our calculations
eveal that even when switching costs are substantial, the invest-
ent effect can still dominate. A higher switching cost forces the
rm to charge a lower price, resulting in less proﬁt. Nevertheless,he rows with respect to the parameters in the 
τ λ μ
 01 −0 . 0932 −0 . 2838 0.9228 
 0313 −0 . 8750 −4 . 8125 −3 . 9688 
18 −0 . 2377 0.2966 0.0179 
 0109 −1 . 1413 −5 . 8804 −3 . 5109 
25 −0 . 2177 −0 . 0476 0.0083 
24 −0 . 2186 −0 . 0521 0.0058 
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o  also consumer surplus goes down, both for the situation with P2P
as well as the situation without P2P. This is caused by the higher
switching costs as incurred by the consumers in both cases and
the higher downloading costs in the presence of P2P. 
Consumers’ taste heterogeneity is inversely related to the pa-
rameter λ: a larger λ implies less heterogeneity. Both tables reveal
that an increase in λ leads to a lower price. In the situation with-
out P2P, a higher λ makes it more diﬃcult to attract consumers to
the store and, despite the lower price, the effect on sales is nega-
tive. In the situation with P2P, these effects are reenforced by more
consumers going to the network, resulting in even more negative
effects on sales and proﬁts in particular. Apparently, more hetero-
geneity complicates the formation of the P2P network and hence is
beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm. Both with and without P2P, welfare is neg-
atively affected by a decrease in heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the
effect of λ on consumer surplus should be interpreted with cau-
tion, since the parameter λ determines the size of the shocks to
the consumers’ utilities and, thus, has a direct effect on consumers
surplus, in addition to other effects operating through the ﬁrm’s
pricing policy and the development of the network. 
All elasticities with respect to the generic cost factor of down-
loading σ have opposite signs as the elasticities with respect to
the valuation of downloads γ . Higher σ implies higher download-
ing costs for everyone, making P2P less attractive to consumers,
similar to the effects of lower γ . However, the interpretation of σ
and γ are quite different, which makes the implications different
as well. The quality parameter γ measures the value of a down-
load to a consumer regardless of how the download is acquired.
Thus, γ only reﬂects the intrinsic quality of the downloaded copy,
e.g. in the case of music, the sound quality. It does not reﬂect the
fact that the copy has to be illegally downloaded and that it costs
time and effort. That is what the cost factor σ captures. 
Enforcement of intellectual property rights relates to an in-
creased value of σ . Table 6 shows that a higher σ improves the
proﬁt of the ﬁrm and decreases consumer surplus and welfare. The
total welfare suffers due to the lower size of the network n and the
sheer downloading costs that are incurred for those who do down-
load. In other words, a social planner who aims at maximizing wel-
fare should be careful in enforcing intellectual property rights in
the context of P2P ﬁle sharing, considering the welfare enhancing
effect of P2P shown in this crude yet vivid demonstration. 
Furthermore, an increase in σ does not lead to an increase in
the price of the legal product as intuition may suggest, since high
σ harms the attractiveness of the P2P network against which the
ﬁrm competes in price. In fact, if anything, the price decreases
slightly in σ . This is attributable to the price elasticity of demand
for the legal product, just as for the effects of β and γ on the
price. To put it simply, when σ increases, the P2P network be-
comes less attractive and there are a lot more potential consumers
out there for the ﬁrm to win over, and hence it charges a slightly
lower price to attract these switching consumers. Conversely, when
σ decreases, P2P becomes more attractive and a big chunk of con-
sumers will go to the network, making the remaining consumers in
the store relatively inelastic to prices, and hence the higher price.
Ultimately, this pricing scheme is caused by the convex form of
the downloading cost function with respect to the network size,
c(n ) = σ/ (ρ + n ) . 
7. Concluding remarks and managerial insights 
This paper uses a dynamic model to solve the optimal pricing
policy for a ﬁrm that makes legal sales of music products and com-
petes with the P2P ﬁle-sharing networks on the Internet. 
An interesting point of this model is that we can observe the
dynamics of network formation. We can also observe exactly how
the ﬁrm sets its price conditional on its market share and the net-ork size. While for given network size the price the ﬁrm sets is
enerally increasing in its market share, for a given market share
he price behaves non-monotonically in the network size. Some-
imes the ﬁrm sets the price very low in order to win vital market
hares to ﬁght against the P2P network, while at other times it ac-
ommodates the network by setting a high price to reap the proﬁt
rom its own customers. 
In the comparative static analysis of the model, one of our most
mportant ﬁndings is that total welfare is negatively related to the
eneric cost factor of downloading. This result coincides with the
ndings by Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Herings et al. (2010) in
he sense that the existence of P2P actually enhances total wel-
are. This implies that by making ﬁle-sharing more diﬃcult for the
onsumers, the government is effectively curbing the society from
njoying a high welfare level that P2P technology would generate.
n our set-up the increase in total welfare is caused by the increase
n consumer surplus being overwhelmingly larger in size than the
ecrease in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. August and Tunca (2008) argues that
ncreased enforcement of property rights can actually hurt vendor
roﬁts and Tunca and Wu (2013) presents evidence that a higher
etection and prosecution rate for piracy can reduce the ﬁrm’s
roﬁts due to strategic effects. 
Other ﬁndings include an interesting pricing scheme of the ﬁrm
n the sense that the steady state price decreases when the le-
al product becomes more attractive (higher valuation of the le-
al product or higher generic cost factor of downloading), and in-
reases in the valuation of the competing product (higher valuation
f the downloads and lower generic cost factor of downloading).
ike in Herings et al. (2010) , this is due to the convex functional
orm of the cost of downloads, which affects the price elasticity of
emand of the legal product. 
From the ﬁrm’s perspective, we can answer the question “Ac-
ommodate it or ﬁght it?” in the title as follows. On the one hand
he optimal pricing policy shows that, ceteris paribus, the ﬁrm
esponds to a drop in sales by a drop in prices and sets lower
rices when the network is relatively small, which indicates that
he ﬁrm does ﬁght. But, on the other hand, the ﬁrm cannot deter
he evolvement of the P2P network without pricing sub-optimally,
nd hence will not ﬁght till the bitter end, thereby ultimately ac-
ommodating the P2P network. 
Instead of ﬁghting against P2P networks, the music industry
as also resorted to alternative business models. We already docu-
ented the rise of legal downloads in 2007. Meanwhile, subscrip-
ion audio streaming services like Spotify and pure ad-supported
ideo streaming services like Youtube and Vevo were introduced.
nother development is the appearance of online radio platforms
ike Pandora. All these services contribute to the revenues of the
ecord companies, but have by no means eliminated the huge
roblems posed by illegally obtained music. We believe that the
xtension of our model to incorporate these new developments
ould be a highly interesting direction for future research. 
Although we have restricted ourselves to a model where the
nly shocks are in the utility functions of the consumers, our ap-
roach can easily be used to deal with other shocks. Examples
ould be shocks on the supply side like new production technolo-
ies, for instance the ones described in the previous paragraph,
hich could be treated by introducing stochastic shocks to the
tility of the legal product β or its per unit production costs μ.
tochastic shocks may also affect the demand side, for instance
hen there are new legal developments, which would affect the
eneric cost factor σ of downloading. We think that the introduc-
ion of these kinds of shocks would be an interesting direction for
uture research as well. 
Finally, it must be clariﬁed that the results of this paper by
o means support the infringement of intellectual property rights
r piracy in general. Although it is beyond the analysis of this
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Z  aper, it is worth discussing whether indeed a new form of IPR
echanism (especially copyrights law) is needed in this fast-paced
nformation-based society. Perhaps one that is much more relaxed
ith regard to the fair use of copyrighted materials. After all,
he Web2.0 concept (community-based web environments such as
acebook, YouTube, and Myspace) encourages new content creation
y the average public on such a massive scale that the traditional
edia could never have dreamed of. Yet, the existing copyright
aws to a large extent stand in the way of such creative activi-
ies. Moreover, copyright laws are meant to encourage and protect
reative incentives. When are creators hurt so much that their cre-
tive incentives are hindered by ﬁle-sharing? One should not forget
hat the content creators and the intellectual property rights own-
rs are very often different entities – the former being the artists
nd the latter being the publishing ﬁrms. Damages incurred to IPR
wners do not necessarily imply damages incurred to content cre-
tors, and it is the latter’s creative incentives that matter. When
nalyzing the impact of movie broadcasts on DVD sales and In-
ernet piracy, Smith and Telang (2009) suggest that creative artists
an use product differentiation and market segmentation strategies
o compete with freely available copies of their content. Is it not a
ood thing to reach an otherwise impossibly large audience even
f that means one has to give away some music for free? In order
o answer these questions, one has to consider the development of
uantity, quality and variety of the music products over the years
nd search for signs of improvement or deterioration. 
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